

## APOLLO'S FIRST LOVE: PINDAR, *PYTH.* 9.26 ff.

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The Ninth Pythian is the most romantic of Pindar's odes. Though composed for Telesicrates, the winner of the hoplite-race at Delphi in 474, it concerns his city, Cyrene, which, as we learn elsewhere (*Pyth.* 5.24), possessed a "sweet garden of Aphrodite" (γλυκὺν κῆπον Ἀφροδίτας) and is here (74) called Telesicrates' "land of fair women" (καλλιγύναικι πάτρα). Four myths tell stories of love and marriage and it is said in praise of the victor (98-100) that young women who were spectators of his victory prayed silently that they might have such a husband or son. The luxuriance of the imagery of vegetation, and in particular the occurrence of the plucked flower (37 and 110), have been seen to be especially appropriate, not only to the fertile land of Libya, but also to the erotic theme of the ode.<sup>1</sup>

So insistent is the theme of marriage that it has seemed to many that it must have an application to the victor himself, apart from the obvious implication that he is praised for his beauty and attractiveness.<sup>2</sup> For this purpose the first and longest of the myths, which tells of Apollo's love for the nymph Cyrene and the birth of Aristaeus (5-70), has proved most suggestive. But here everything depends upon the interpretation of the scene, the most memorable passage in the ode, in which Apollo seeks the advice of Cheiron concerning his love for Cyrene. He is still enrolled as a pupil in the Centaur's school for

<sup>1</sup> R. W. B. Burton, *Pindar's Pythian Odes* (Oxford 1962) 44. I am grateful to two former pupils, Dr. Emmet Robbins and Mr. Donald J. Mastronarde, who have made me aware of the frequency of imagery of this kind and of other kinds in the ode.

<sup>2</sup> It is worth noticing that πόσις, which is used of Telesicrates (99), had already been used at a climactic point of the myth of Cyrene (51).

heroes, where Achilles, Asclepius, and Jason were also reared in the Greek excellences, and the authority of the wise Cheiron, and of his answer, is unquestionable, if we could only divine its meaning. Much depends upon our reading of his words, as may be seen from the strange interpretations put upon them by eminent Pindarists. For cautionary purposes it is sufficient to mention, after Gildersleeve,<sup>3</sup> the views of three scholars of the last century, Friedrich Mezger, Ludolph Dissen, and August Boeckh. The first thought that Telesicrates is urged to hasten his marriage, the second that he was guilty of the rape of a Theban girl, and the third that he is cautioned (in Gildersleeve's dry paraphrase) "against the anticipation of the lawful joys of marriage." More recent critics have recognised a moral that persuasion be preferred to violence in love, in case Telesicrates or his friends had need of such advice, or a concern to distinguish marriage from sex in the loves of gods for mortal women, as if there existed for these purposes courting-customs, established churches, or registry-offices.<sup>4</sup> The book of the wise sayings of Cheiron, the *Ῥποθηκαι Χείρωνος*, must have presented a pattern unfamiliar to the education of the Greek nobility, if it contained matter of this kind.<sup>5</sup>

After a rapid account of Cyrene's abduction by Apollo from Pelion to Libya and of her lineal descent from Earth and Ocean, the myth paints an enchanting picture of the girl's scorn for womanly occupations and her indefatigable hunting of wild beasts.<sup>6</sup> Apollo first sees her engaged in single combat with a terrific lion and at once summons Cheiron from his cave with words of wonder for her fearlessness and two questions concerning her origins. There follows the critical passage, another double question:

<sup>3</sup> B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (New York 1885) 337-38.

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., R. P. Winnington-Ingram, "Pindar's Ninth Pythian Ode" *BICS* 16 (1969) 9-15, especially 10-11; R. W. B. Burton, *Pindar's Pyth. Odes* 40; L. Illig, *Zur Form der pindarischen Erzählung* (Berlin 1932) 44-45. The proprieties are a common preoccupation of commentators: Illig 37 supposes that Cheiron advises that Apollo and Cyrene should come indoors and Winnington-Ingram 11, that Cyrene should receive "a proper establishment".

<sup>5</sup> On the *Ῥποθηκαι Χείρωνος*, see R. Merkelbach and M. L. West, *Fragmenta Hesiodica* (Oxford 1967) fr. 283-85; W. Jaeger, *Paideia*<sup>2</sup> 1 (Oxford 1945) 25; J. Schwartz, *Pseudo-Hesiodica* (Leiden 1960) 228-44.

<sup>6</sup> Cyrene bears a certain resemblance to Apollo's sister, Artemis: cf. *Hom.H.* 27 and *II.* 21.471 and 485-86.

ὅσια κλυτὰν χέρα οἱ προσενεγκεῖν,  
ἦρα<sup>7</sup> καὶ ἐκ λεχέων κείραι μελιαδέα ποίαν;

Cheiron passes over the first pair of questions and addresses himself directly to the second.<sup>8</sup>

It is disappointing that we cannot fix precisely the spirit of Cheiron's response, for it is just the tone and temper of the passage that are in question. He speaks *ζαμενής*,<sup>9</sup> by virtue of his prophetic wisdom, and his brow is gentle, *ἀγανᾶ* . . . *ὀφρύι*, unmarked by any frown.<sup>10</sup> He laughs, but the particular quality of his laughter is likely to elude us because of the textual uncertainty. *χλιαρόν* (*γελάσσαις*) is the reading of our MSS, but *χλαρόν* is given by the scholia. The metre requires a dissyllable, so that *χλιαρόν* must be an interpretation of the unfamiliar *χλαρόν*. This derivation is in fact offered by one of the scholiasts (2.226 Drachmann), who show even greater doubts about the true reading. They are able to suggest, in addition to *χλιαρόν*, an unknown *χλιδόν* (or *χληδόν*). From the first they derive the sense "warm" and so "gentle and pleasant" (*προσηνῇ καὶ τερπνᾷ*), from the second a notion of quantity (*χλιδόν γὰρ λέγουσι τὸ πλήθος . . . οὕτως οὖν ἐπιπολὺ γελάσας*). Both interpretations seem mere guesses, without adequate support.

Hesychius glosses *χλαρόν* with five unsuitable meanings (*ῥυπαρόν*, *λεπτόν*, *τρυχαλέον*, *ὠχρόν* and *ἐλαιηρὸς κώθων*), but also with *κόχλαξ*. This last is identified by *LSJ* with *κάχληξ*, a "pebble," which seems to be an onomatopoeic formation, "the plasher," from *καχλάζω*. If we

<sup>7</sup> On the contracted form *ἦρα*, see J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford 1954) 284. This reading is preferable to putting a question mark after *ἦ ῥα*, with Gildersleeve, or using the disjunctive *ἦ ῥα*, with Hermann. The first seems too artificial and the second misconceives the relation between Apollo's questions, as if he wished to distinguish between sex and marriage.

<sup>8</sup> U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Pindaros* (Berlin 1922) 267–68, is concerned with Pindar's relation with his source for the story of Cyrene, the Hesiodic *Ehoiai*. It has been inferred that Apollo's first question, concerning her origins, is an undigested survival from that source, in which it was answered by Cheiron: see O. Schroeder, *Pindars Pythien* (Leipzig and Berlin 1922) 80; L. Illig, *Zur Form d. pind. Erz.* 35; R. W. B. Burton, *Pindar's Pyth. Odes* 39–40. It is certain that Pindar has already included Cyrene's genealogy in his narrative (13–18), but his poetic purpose in separating the question from its answer remains unexplained. Perhaps the first question is merely to establish that this is Apollo's first sight of Cyrene.

<sup>9</sup> So Medea is *Αἰήτα* . . . *ζαμενής παῖς* at *Pyth.* 4. 10–11.

<sup>10</sup> A. S. F. Gow argues in *CR* 58 (1944) 38–39 for a wider meaning of *ὀφρύς*, to include "eye" and "lid" as well as "brow".

could believe that this sense came from a gloss on our passage, it would be possible to suppose that some one found an onomatopoeic sense in *χλαρόν* and glossed the rare word with the “plasher.” Such a sense perhaps, is found in connection with laughter in the familiar Aeschylean (*Prom. Vinct.* 90–91) *ποντίων τε κυμάτων ἀνήριθμον γέλασμα*. But this is only another guess.

Of modern conjectures the best is Schroeder’s *χλοαρόν*, though parallels are lacking. Schroeder himself acknowledges the difficulty of interpreting colour-words in extended senses and is willing to contemplate such diverse meanings as “mocking” or “faint” laughter. The conjecture provides us with a possible word but no secure sense.

On the other hand, the scholiasts, in spite of their uncertainties about the text, show some considerable feeling for the sense that is required. They offer *κεχαλασμένον*, and, in connection with another interpretation, speak of a *διάχυσις*, which is contrasted with a frown. Indeed, the verb *χαλάω* is used of the remission of anger and with the dative signifies “to be indulgent to.” It may well be that *χλᾶρόν* existed as an alternative for *χᾶλᾶρόν* and is what Pindar wrote.<sup>11</sup> In that case Cheiron’s smile would be “cheery” or the like, the opposite of a frown, and would signify approval and indulgence. A cheery smile that banishes anger and reproach and promises indulgence to Apollo is in fact a more appropriate attitude for the Centaur to take in response to Apollo’s questions and agrees well with the expression of gentleness that he wears on his brow.

The notion that there is an edge of rebuke or irony in the Centaur’s response, which is widely held, cannot be supported by the description of his expression, so far as we can determine it. It rests instead on a common interpretation of Apollo’s questions and Cheiron’s answer.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> See *LSJ s.v. χαλάω* I.2 and 8 for the two relevant senses of the verb. After this paper had been submitted for publication I was glad to read in *CP* 67 (October 1972) 288–91, E. D. Francis’ “‘Chiron’s Laughter’ (*Pyth.* 9.38),” in which he argues with greater fulness the proposal that \**χλαρός* be explained as an adjective formed from the root of *χαλάσαι*. He compares the pattern of *σκελε-/σκλη-*, *δαμα-/δμᾶ*, *θανα-/θνᾶ-*, *κτλ.*

<sup>12</sup> For the most recent and candid statement of the view, see R. P. Winnington-Ingram in *BICS* 16 (1969) 10. He writes: “Is it right to do what? To go straight out on to the hillside and rape the girl. This is the clear suggestion of *χέρα οἱ προσενεγκεῖν*; and when Apollo says *κείραι μελιαδέα ποίαν*, he is thinking of his own pleasure only. That is the question . . .” Winnington-Ingram offers no argument in support of “the

That interpretation, in turn, needs only to be plainly stated to be shown to be absurd. It holds, in its most explicit form, that the god asks permission to rape the girl. But in fact there is nothing in Apollo's language that proposes or implies the use of violence. It is true that, much earlier, at the beginning of the myth (6), the violent verb *ἄρπασ'* was used of Apollo, but that occurred in a description of Cyrene's forcible abduction from the vales of Pelion to the rich land of Libya; it has nothing to say about sexual assault. It would indeed be grotesque for Apollo to make an enquiry about holiness, of the kind that all Greeks made to him at Delphi, with regard to his own commission of so brutal an act.<sup>13</sup>

Nor does the interpretation receive any support from the gnomic passage which follows immediately after Cheiron's speech (66-69):

ὥκεῖα δ' ἐπειγομένων ἥδη θεῶν  
 πρᾶξις ὁδοί τε βραχεῖαι. κείνο κείν' ἀ-  
 μαρ διαίτασεν· θαλάμῳ δὲ μίγυν  
 ἐν πολυχρύσῳ Λιβύας.

The subject is a traditional view of the divine omnipotence, which hardly needs illustration after Cheiron's eloquent statement on omniscience. Because the gods hold in their hands the "ends" (τέλη,

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clear suggestion" of Pindar's language. Cf. also L. Illig, *Zur Form d. pind. Erz.* 36: "In der Wendung *χέρα προσενεγκεῖν* kommt mit jener sinnlichen Anschaulichkeit, die der ganzen Darstellungen V. 26-37 eigen ist, die Gewaltsamkeit einer solchen Vereinigung ebenso zum Ausdruck wie in der entsprechenden Wendung bei Homer, II. T 261, wo Agamemnon schwört: *μὴ μὲν ἐγὼ κούρῃ Βρισηΐδι χεῖρ' ἐπένεικα, / οὐτ' εὐνῆς πρόφασιν κεχηρμένος οὔτε τεύ' ἄλλου.*" But Agamemnon says simply that he has never slept with Briseis: cf. the parallel passage at 9.133: *μὴ ποτε τῆς εὐνῆς ἐπιβήμεναι ἥδὲ μίγηναι.* That is the only assurance that might satisfy Achilles. It must be significant also that the "touch" (ἔφαψις) of Zeus by which Io conceived Epaphus, so far from implying violence, could be imagined by Aeschylus (*Suppl.* 40-48, 315) as a breath (ἔξ ἐπιπνοίας). Similarly, touch is non-violent, though erotic, in two occurrences in *Pyth.* 9 itself (11 and 120). C. A. P. Ruck and W. H. Matheson, *Pindar: Selected Odes* (Ann Arbor, Michigan 1968) 211 believe that Apollo and Cheiron are "bantering about the relative virtues of rape and seduction" and find that this exchange "provides a light tone".

<sup>13</sup> Both Apollo's question (δσία, 36) and Cheiron's answer (οὐ θεμιτὸν, 42) are made in terms of holiness. What this implies for the union of the god and the nymph is set forth in Cheiron's prophecy of her destiny and is symbolised in the *ἐρατὰν αἰδῶ* (12) that Aphrodite sheds over the pair. Cf. the familiar story, in Hdt. 6.86 γ, of the repudiation by the oracle at Delphi of an enquiry concerning a criminal proposal.

τελευταί, πείρατα) of all things,<sup>14</sup> they are said by the poets to do all things "easily" (ῥεῖα).<sup>15</sup> They move through the world with great speed,<sup>16</sup> overtaking, as Pindar himself says (*Pyth.* 2.49–52), the eagle on the wing or the dolphin in the sea. Their influence on man is swift, as in the occurrence of love, the achievement of excellence, or even in the delivery of their children.<sup>17</sup> In a famous simile of the *Iliad* their swiftness of movement is likened, by a rare comparison, to that of thought itself.<sup>18</sup> It is therefore in no way remarkable that they are said to be swift also in love.<sup>19</sup> Nowhere in this theme is there a necessary suggestion of violence<sup>20</sup> and there is no more implied in our passage of the Ninth Pythian than in its echo at the end of the ode (114) in the ὠκύτατον γάμον of the daughters of Danaus or in the marriage of Alexidamus to the daughter of the Libyan Antaeus. The theme of speed, which recurs throughout the poem,<sup>21</sup> is not only romantically but also theologically just.

To attribute to Pindar the situation as conceived by current interpretations is to confuse his easy relationship with traditional religion with the quite different attitudes of the sophistic enlightenment. If it could be shown that Pindar viewed such matters with the eyes of Euripides,<sup>22</sup> it would be possible to speak of Cheiron's reply to what has been called "Apollo's somewhat fast proposition."<sup>23</sup> As it is, it is quite

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Archil. fr. 57 and 84.2 D<sup>3</sup>; Alcman fr. 1.83–84 PMG; Solon fr. 1.17 D<sup>3</sup>; Sem. fr. 1.1–2 D<sup>3</sup>; Theognis 133–42, 201–202, 660, 1075–78; Pind. *Ol.* 13.83 and 104–105; *Pyth.* 9. 44–45; 10.10 and 49–50; *Nem.* 10.29–30; fr. 108A Snell<sup>3</sup>; Bacch. 11. 4–7 Snell<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Il.* 3.381 = 20.444; 10.556; 15.361–62; 16.690; *Od.* 3.231; 10.573; 16.198 and 211; Alcaeus fr. 34A.7–8 L–P; Sim. fr. 20: 525 PMG; and Pind. *Ol.* 13.83.

<sup>16</sup> *Il.* 5.770–772; 13.20–21; Pind. *Pyth.* 3.43. Cf. also *Il.* 2.17, 786; 3.129; 5.353; 8.42, 392, 399; *Od.* 1.96–97.

<sup>17</sup> Sappho fr. 1.21 L–P; Pind. fr. 108.1–4 Snell<sup>3</sup>; *Ol.* 6.43–44 and *Nem.* 1.35–36.

<sup>18</sup> *Il.* 15.80–83. Cf. *Hom. H. Merc.* 43–46.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *Il.* 16.184, where Hermes acts at once (αὐτίκα) after falling in love with Poly-mela, and Apoll. *Bibl.* 3.10.3 (on the story of Coronis): καὶ φασιν ἐρασθῆναι ταύτης Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ εὐθέως συνελθεῖν.

<sup>20</sup> In the context of the tragic πάθος μάθος the divine favour may be conceived as a χάρις βίαιος, as in Aesch. *Agam.* 182; cf. 385. There is a lyrical anticipation of the tragic paradox in Pind. *Pyth.* 4.219 (μάστιγι Πειθοῦς) and perhaps in *Ol.* 6.83: see TAPA 86 (1955) 39.

<sup>21</sup> It is noteworthy that αὐτίκα occurs three times in the ode (29, 57, and 114A).

<sup>22</sup> Cf., e.g., what is said in Euripides' *Ion* of Apollo's violence (437) and Creusa's *aidōs* (336, 861, 977). This attitude, like Xenophanes' attacks on anthropomorphism, from which it depends, is altogether opposed to the Pindaric world.

<sup>23</sup> R. W. B. Burton, *Pindar's Pyth. Odes* 43.

clear that Pindar's general attitude is still firmly rooted in tradition and the language of this passage gives no grounds for making an exception here.

Even so, Apollo's questions may seem surprising enough. He asks in effect whether it is in accord with divine right (*δσία*) that he take the girl as his lover.

*δσία κλυτὰν χέρα οἱ προσενεγκεῖν,  
ἦρα καὶ ἐκ λεχέων κείραι μελιαδέα ποίαν;*

It is Cheiron who shows us how to take these words.

His reply, which his inspiration enables him to make at once, is framed in the language of prophetic wisdom and requires careful interpretation.

*κρυπταὶ κλαῖδες ἐντὶ σοφᾶς  
Πειθοῦς ἱερᾶν φιλοτάτων,  
Φοῖβε, καὶ ἔν τε θεοῖς τοῦτο κἀνθρώποις ὁμῶς  
αἰδέοντ', ἀμφανδὸν ἀδεί-  
ας τυχεῖν τὸ πρῶτον εὐνᾶς.*

The main structure is clear enough: there is first a chiasmic connection between concealment and openness (*κρυπταὶ* and *ἀμφανδόν* . . .), secondly another between wisdom and *aidôs* (*σοφᾶς* and *αἰδέοντ'*), and lastly parallel endings on the origins of love (*κλαῖδες* . . . *σοφᾶς Πειθοῦς ἱερᾶν φιλοτάτων* and *ἀδείας τυχεῖν τὸ πρῶτον εὐνᾶς*). The image is no more difficult to make visual: Peitho is the holder of the keys (*κληδοῦχος*) of the shrine of the holy loves. Eros performs a similar function in a parallel passage of Euripides (*Hipp.* 540; cf. Aristoph. *Eccl.* 976). Peitho must therefore be the attendant of Aphrodite, who is familiar in lyric verse and in fine art<sup>24</sup> and embodies the attraction of love.<sup>25</sup> Although her function here has been regularly misunderstood, it is readily explained, if attention is given to the structure of the passage. Cheiron is concerned with the beginnings of love<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Sappho fr. 96.26–29; 200 L–P; Ibycus fr. 7: 288 PMG; Pind. *Pyth.* 4.219 and fr. 122.2 Snell<sup>3</sup>; Aesch. *Suppl.* 1034–42. See also *RE* 19.1 (1937) 194–217.

<sup>25</sup> Peitho is *θέλκτωρ* at Aesch. *Suppl.* 1040 and *θελκτήριον* at *Eum.* 886.

<sup>26</sup> The plain sense of *ἀδείας τυχεῖν τὸ πρῶτον εὐνᾶς* is wrongly weakened by commentators: see, e.g., L. Illig, *Zur Form d. pind. Erz.* 37, note 6; O. Schroeder, *Pindars Pythien* 82 comments on *τὸ πρῶτον*: "es umschreibt eben nur *Ἥβας καρπὸν ἀνθήσαντ' ἀποδρέψαι*."

and for that reason speaks of the keys by which the shrine of love is unlocked. In that connection Peitho, who is love's motive power, is more appropriate than Eros himself, who serves in the Euripidean version. The identity of Peitho is established by the closely-woven context of the Centaur's wise saying; there is no need of external references.<sup>27</sup>

Peitho is said also to be wise, or skilful, in the use of her keys and this virtue is symmetrically matched in the passage by the *aidōs* shown by gods and men alike about openly beginning love-making. The *aidōs* of gods and men, one infers, is part of the *σοφία* of Peitho. The attraction exercised by love could never succeed in moving a young lover to begin if he had not the protection of *aidōs*.<sup>28</sup> The keys used by Peitho must be kept hidden and openness both in word and in deed avoided in a first love. There *aidōs* is the rule and the fact.<sup>29</sup>

*Aidōs* is a special virtue of the youthful in Homer and in archaic literature.<sup>30</sup> In the *Odyssey*, for example, it takes the form of respect for elders in the case of Telemachus and of modest circumspection with men in the case of Nausicaa. Whereas Telemachus is inhibited from approaching Nestor and asking him questions, Nausicaa cannot bring

<sup>27</sup> As (e.g.) by L. Illig, *Zur Form d. pind. Erz.* 37: "Der Sinn dieser implizite gegebenen Antwort ist klar: Apollon wird und kann nicht seiner Begierde sogleich hier im Tal vor der Höhle des Chiron folgen;" or by R. P. Winnington-Ingram in *BICS* 16 (1969) 10-11: "But *peitho* implies its opposite, which is *bia* (or *ananke*); and violence has already been suggested, first by *ἄρπασ'* (6) and now by the *χέρα προσενεγκεῖν* of the god's question (36). Apollo must woo Cyrene, not rape her." Winnington-Ingram thinks (12-13) of a connection with Aeschylus' Danaid trilogy.

<sup>28</sup> Cheiron's wisdom thus offers a commentary on the image of *ἐρατὰν αἰδῶ* (12) shed by Aphrodite on Apollo and Cyrene.

<sup>29</sup> It is satisfactory to notice that the scholiasts (2.227 Drachmann), who are slighted by modern interpreters of the passage, were on the right lines on this point: *ἐπὶ αἰσχυνόμεθα περὶ τούτων λέγειν καὶ κρυπτῶς ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖται, καὶ σὺ αἰδούμενός με ἐρωτᾷς· ἐπίστασαι γὰρ μάντις ὦν*. The combination of motifs in *Pyth.* 9.26 ff. is evidently traditional, as we see from the account of the *Διὸς ἀπάτη* at *Il.* 14. 153 ff., where we find many of the same elements used in an erotic context, though for the purpose of seduction. There is mention (168) of a *κληῖδι κρυπτῇ* of Hera's chamber, of persuasion, love, and *αἰδώς* (208-210, where this last is, however, of a different kind), of the need for privacy and the fear of *νέμεσις* (330-40).

<sup>30</sup> See the general study of C. E. Frhr. von Erffa, *ΑΙΔΩΣ und verwandte Begriffe* in *Philologus* Suppl. Bd. 30.2 (1937); G. Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*<sup>3</sup> (Oxford 1925) 83-92; W. J. Verdenius, "ΑΙΔΩΣ bei Homer" *Mnemosyne* ser. 3, vol. 12 (1945) 47-60. Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* 4.9.3: 1128b16) says of *aidōs*: οὐ πάση δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ.



herself to speak openly to her father of marriage.<sup>31</sup> In the *Cypria*, when Nemesis flees from the embraces of Zeus, she does so because of the influence of *aidōs*.<sup>32</sup> Alcaeus, according to Aristotle,<sup>33</sup> confessed that *aidōs* prevented him from speaking his mind and thereby received a sharp rebuke from Sappho.<sup>34</sup> In Aristophanes' *Clouds* (995) *aidōs*, as respect for ancestors and elders, is recognised as part of the old education, now attacked by the Unjust Argument. Finally, Euripides' Hippolytus, in a famous speech (*Hipp.* 73 ff.), speaks of a pure meadow, ungrazed and unmown, which is tended by a gardener, who is *Aidōs*, for the sake of those in whom *sophrosyne* is inborn. Both of these traditional forms of *aidōs*, respect for age and shyness about sex, are likely to be felt by Pindar's Apollo, but it is the latter that is in question here and is the subject of Cheiron's instruction. In offering advice to the god on this subject the Centaur recognises the traditional place of *aidōs* in good breeding.<sup>35</sup>

His general point made, Cheiron next turns to its application to Apollo:

καὶ γὰρ σέ, τὸν οὐ θεμιτὸν ψεύδει θιγέειν  
ἔτραπε μείλιχος ὄργᾳ παρφάμεν τοῦ-  
τον λόγον.

He continues with a fine passage on the god's omniscience and, with sage tactfulness,<sup>36</sup> agrees nevertheless to instruct the all-wise concerning the destiny of Cyrene. His attitude of benevolence and understanding could not be made more plain. His meaning however has proved elusive and yields only to careful reading.

<sup>31</sup> *Od.* 3.24: αἰδῶς δ' αὖ νέον ἄνδρα γεραίτερον ἐξέρεεσθαι; 6.66-67: αἰδετο γὰρ θαλερὸν γάμον ἐξονομῆναι. Cf. Eur. *Iph. Taur.* 372 ff.

<sup>32</sup> *Cypria* fr. 7.5-6 Allen: ἐτείρετο γὰρ φρένας αἰδοῖ / καὶ νεμέσει. Cf. the behaviour of Hestia in *Hom.H.Ven.* 21 and of Artemis in *Hom.H.* 27.2.

<sup>33</sup> Arist. *Rhet.* 1.9.20: 1367A: Sappho fr. 137 L-P; D. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford 1955) 104-109.

<sup>34</sup> For other examples, see C. E. von Erffa, *ΑΙΔΩΣ* 100.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Theognis 409-10: οὐδένα θησαυρὸν παισὶν καταθήσει ἀμείνω / αἰδοῦς, ἦτ' ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι, Κύρν', ἔπεται and C. E. von Erffa, *ΑΙΔΩΣ* 74 note 76.

<sup>36</sup> That Cheiron's tactfulness takes a traditional form is shown by a comparison with *Il.* 1.365, where Achilles replies to Thetis: οἶσθα· τί ἦ τοι ταῦτα ἰδυίη πάντ' ἀγορεύω; *Od.* 4.465: οἶσθα, γέρον, τί με ταῦτα παρατροπέων ἐρεεῖνεις; or with Pind. *Pyth.* 4.142: εἰδότηι τοι ἐρέω.

Cheiron speaks of a misstatement made by Apollo (παρφάμεν τοῦτον λόγον). The verb *πάρφαμι* and the noun *πάρφασις*, as used by Pindar, are not distinctly subjective (lying) nor objective (false statement). As often in archaic verse, such a distinction is not to be pressed. But it is undeniable that what Cheiron asserts here is the god's omniscience and it is implied that what he denies is his ignorance, not his untruthfulness. He discovers a discrepancy between the god's questions and his omniscience, and he understands the cause. Apollo, he says, has been under the psychological influence (ἔτραπε) of a *μείλιχος ὀργά*.<sup>37</sup>

Two recent interpretations reveal current understanding of the phrase. Mr R. W. B. Burton takes it to refer to Apollo's passionate mood, or impulse, or feeling, whereas Professor R. P. Winnington-Ingram prefers "pleasant humour."<sup>38</sup> Passion or playfulness has induced Apollo to belie his own omniscience. Cheiron's attitude is then one of worldly connivance or light-hearted humour (possibly mixed with deprecation). But neither, as has been seen, catches the tone of Pindar or of the passage; the wise saying of Cheiron, just interpreted, becomes irrelevant;<sup>39</sup> and the phrase itself does not easily yield the required meaning, as will appear.

*ὀργά* is "temper," "disposition," "feelings," "impulses."<sup>40</sup> To judge by the closest parallel, *Isthm.* 2.35–36 (*ὀργὰν . . . γλυκεῖαν*), this entity is objectively rather than subjectively viewed, for there Xenocrates is praised, not for his inner pleasures or content, but for the pleasure that he gave to others.<sup>41</sup> On this analogy *μείλιχος ὀργά* should not be expected to signify the experience of one's own passion.

<sup>37</sup> On *ἔτραπε*, cf., e.g., *Il.* 6.61; 10.45; *Od.* 3.147; 19.479; Anacreon fr. 30: 375 PMG; Theognis 379; Pind. *Isthm.* 3.10.

<sup>38</sup> See R. W. B. Burton, *Pindar's Pyth. Odes* 41; R. P. Winnington-Ingram in *BICS* 16 (1969) 10. Other versions, though differing in form, show the same division: "some genial humor" (Lattimore); "the honey-sweetness of your mood" (Bowra); "a merry mood" (Farnell); "thy pleasant mood" (Sandys); "quelque souriante fantaisie" (Croiset); "un doux caprice" (Méautis); "un aimable caprice" (Puech); "come ingenuity" (Boeckh); "eine freundliche Stimmung" (Illig); "eine zärtliche Wallung" (Werner); "verliebte Laune" (Welcker); "thy soft desire" (Myers); "the blandishments of lust" (Ruck and Matheson).

<sup>39</sup> But Cheiron's *καὶ γὰρ σέ* (42) explicitly makes the passage an application of the piece of wisdom that precedes.

<sup>40</sup> See W. J. Slater, *Lexicon to Pindar* (Berlin 1969) 387–88.

<sup>41</sup> As shown by *Isthm.* 2.37: *αἰδοῖος μὲν ἦν ἀστοῖς ὀμιλεῖν*. Cf. C. E. von Erffa, *ΑΙΔΩΣ* 80–81 and the *γλυκεῖα φρόν* at *Pyth.* 6.52.

The adjective *μείλιχος* has a similar bent, being regularly used of persons, words, or things that are gentle or kindly to people.<sup>42</sup> The Pindaric use is well displayed by *Ol.* 1.30: *Χάρις δ' ἅπερ ἅπαντα τεύχει τὰ μείλιχα θνατοῖς*. It is *Χάρις*, joy and pleasure, who makes all things *μείλιχα* for mortal men.<sup>43</sup> There is nothing in the word's usage to signify clearly a passionate experience.

"Pleasant mood," on the other hand, is ambiguous. If it signifies a mood that gives pleasure to others, it is an acceptable parallel to *ὀργάν . . . γλυκεῖαν*. But it seems to be intended to bear a different sense, which may be rephrased as "a mood of pleasantry:"<sup>44</sup> Cheiron is thought to detect a joke. The requirements of the context aside, this meaning does not fit *μείλιχος*, which denotes gentle and soothing pleasures, not humorous or ironic diversions. The word is too simple to bear the complex sense desired.

In the first sense "pleasant mood," or better "pleasant disposition," is acceptable, but, if an attempt at humour is excluded, we still have not discovered what is so described. I suggest that the *μείλιχος ὄργα* is the *aidōs* that was the burden of Cheiron's piece of wisdom.<sup>45</sup> Nothing could be more soothingly and agreeably pleasing to others than actions that show a consciousness of shame in their presence and respect for their judgments. In fact the phrase *αἰδοῖ μείλιχ' ἦ* occurs both in Homer and in Hesiod,<sup>46</sup> the combination of ideas is found in a

<sup>42</sup> W. Schmid, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* 1.1 (Munich 1929) 602 and note 10 seeks to find an erotic sense in *μείλιχος* in *Pyth.* 9.43. His suggestion is favourably received by R. W. B. Burton, *Pindar's Pyth. Odes* 41.

<sup>43</sup> For the association of *χάρις* with *αἰδώς*, cf. *Pind. Ol.* 6.76; 7.89; *Hom.H.Cer.* 214–215; *Theognis* 1331. Also with *Πειθώ*: *Pind. fr.* 123.14 Snell<sup>3</sup>; *Hes. Op.* 73; *Ibycus fr.* 7: 288 *PMG*.

<sup>44</sup> According to L. Illig, *Zur Form d. pind. Erz.* 37–38, 43, Cheiron does not take Apollo's apparently brutal questions seriously. Pindar's purpose, on this view, is not to describe psychology but to dismiss an embarrassing incident in his source, the Hesiodic *Ehoiai*.

<sup>45</sup> Once again a scholiast (2.227 Drachmann) is found to offer corroboration: *ἡ αἰδὼς ἐποίησέ σε τὸν μάντιν πυνθάνεσθαι*.

<sup>46</sup> *Od.* 8.172 and *Hes. Theog.* 92. The phrase is clearly part of the literary tradition, but the relation between the two passages is disputed. In favour of the priority of the *Odyssey*, see C. E. von Erffa, *ΑΙΔΩΣ* 45–47; F. Solmsen in *TAPA* 85 (1954) 10–13, and G. P. Edwards, *The Language of Hesiod* (Oxford 1971) 168–69; in favour of that of the *Theogony*, see U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Die Ilias und Homer*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin 1920) 477–78, and M. L. West, *Hesiod: Theogony* (Oxford 1966) 183. Edwards and West give additional bibliography.

repeated line of the *Odyssey* as well as in the *Theogony*,<sup>47</sup> and the Pindaric phrase is an apt description in terms of the usage of early poetry.<sup>48</sup> Cheiron does not speak in ridicule, reproof, irony, or even good-humoured raillery. He does not laugh at Apollo's joke, nor dismiss his question as lacking in seriousness, nor urge restraint upon a ruffianly pupil.<sup>49</sup> He explains to Apollo what is happening to him, showing delight in the god's deference and modesty during the first flush of passion and an amused sense of his own predicament as teacher of an omniscient divinity.<sup>50</sup> The god's *aidōs*, which is the right and natural accompaniment of first love, has diverted him from his own omniscience.<sup>51</sup> Cheiron's explanation, like his manner of giving it, shows him to be benign, understanding, tactful, and wise. His pupil's *μείλιχος ὄργα* has made him *μείλιχον*.<sup>52</sup> His laughter, whatever its precise nature, must have been moved by the same spirit.<sup>53</sup>

The picture of the god as a young and modest pupil of a wise teacher is refreshingly unselfconscious in its candid anthropomorphism. Apollo, though the god of prophecy, behaves with the circumspection

<sup>47</sup> *Od.* 3.96 and 4.326: *μηδέ τι μ' αἰδόμενος μειλίσσαιο μηδ' ἐλεαίρων*; Hes. *Theog.* 80–93: the Muses send to *βασιλῆες αἰδοῖοι* the gift of speech, so that *ἔπεα μείλιχα* flow from their mouths. *Peithō*, which is closely connected with *aidōs* in Cheiron's speech in *Pyth.* 9, is a *γλώσσης ἐμῆς μείλιγμα* at Aesch. *Eum.* 886.

<sup>48</sup> *ὄργα* by itself may signify either a desirable or an undesirable quality and from the date of Aeschylus' *Oresteia* is frequently found in the sense, "anger." It may be opposed to *αἰδώς*, as in Eur. fr. 746 N<sup>2</sup>: *αἰδώς γὰρ ὀργῆς πλεῖον ὠφελεῖ βροτούς*. In *Pyth.* 9.43, therefore, *μείλιχος* bears the weight of the phrase. This contextual coloration is in Pindar's manner: see *Pyth.* 1.89: *εὐανθεῖ δ' ἐν ὀργᾷ*; 4.141: *θεμισσαμένους ὀργάς*; *Isthm.* 5.34: *μεγαλήτορες ὄργαι*; as well as *Isthm.* 2.35–36.

<sup>49</sup> On the attitudes attributed to Apollo, Cheiron, and Pindar by the commentators, see L. Illig, *Zur Form d. pind. Erz.* 38 ff. and R. W. B. Burton, *Pindar's Pyth. Odes* 40.

<sup>50</sup> B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar* 342. Gildersleeve, however, under the influence of *χλιαρόν* (38), speaks of "the half-smile of the great teacher." Cf. *Pyth.* 3.1 ff., 45 ff., 63 ff.: 4.102 ff.

<sup>51</sup> In addition to other constraints, *aidōs* is often said to inhibit speech: see pp. 568 above and Theognis 1179–80, Aesch. *Choeph.* 665–66, fr. 225.12 Mette. It may override judgment, as in *Il.* 10.234–39.

<sup>52</sup> That the expected effect of *ἔπεα μείλιχα* is to produce a like response is shown negatively by *Il.* 11.136–37: *ὥς τῷ γε κλαίοντε προσανδήτην βασιλῆα / μείλιχίους ἐπέεσσιν ἀμείλικτον δ' ὅπ' ἄκουσαν*. In principle, it is credible that language prompted by a *μείλιχος ὄργα* consists of *ἔπεα μείλιχα*; in fact, Cheiron uses of it the verb *πάρφαμεν*, which is regularly used of winning, as well as false, speech. See *Il.* 12.249; *Od.* 2.189, 16.287, 19.6; Hes. *Theog.* 90; Parm. B 1.15 VS.

<sup>53</sup> The smile that Athena bestows on Odysseus at *Od.* 13.287 is a similar recognition of affinity, but in trickery rather than in respect for age and wisdom.

of a well-bred youth who falls in love for the first time. The candour of his passion identifies him as a male and a god, but in his deference to his teacher and to the code of manners in which he has been reared, he is the counterpart of Nausicaa herself. Whereas her *aidôs* prevented her, no matter what her feelings, from speaking to her father of marriage, he was impelled by the same motive, in spite of the heat of passion, to ask the wise Centaur whether the satisfaction of his desires was right and proper. The full humanity of the god, I conceive, was as important to Pindar, and to traditional belief, as his august knowledge and power, but it was an adornment rather than an embarrassment for him to be moved by *aidôs*. Apollo's omniscience could not be refractory to Cheiron's tutelage, for the wisdom of the mentor of heroes was the same as the knowledge of the god.

By the time of Pindar's death the main intellectual movements in Greece were eroding the base upon which such beliefs and attitudes were built. In particular, the radical distinction between *nomos* and *physis* was to destroy for many, in addition to other things, the possibility of contemplating the naturalness of *aidôs* either in gods or in men.<sup>54</sup> The resulting turmoil in thought and society is reflected on the one hand in the attack on *aidôs* as part of the old education in Aristophanes' *Clouds* and on the other in Euripides' merciless onslaughts on anthropomorphism. From that time Greek poetry lost the capacity that it had for so long possessed of encompassing all things, both human and divine, in a single, freshly visual imagination. Our appreciation of Pindar's achievement in the Ninth Pythian is enhanced by awareness of an innocence that was soon to be lost forever.

<sup>54</sup> On the decline of *aidôs* from the fourth century, see G. Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*<sup>3</sup> 89–92. The attempt by conservatives like Plato and Isocrates to revive it is pointed out by W. Jaeger, *Paideia*<sup>2</sup> 3.122, 226 with 340 note 85.